Abstract. There are not effective and practical methods for interval-valued (IV) cooperative games due to the invertible interval subtraction. This paper focuses on developing a fast and simplified approach to computing IV egalitarian Shapley values for such a rather large subclass of IV cooperative games. In this method, through adding some weaker coalition monotonicity-like conditions, it is proven that egalitarian Shapley value is monotonic and non-decreasing. Hence, the IV egalitarian Shapley value of IV cooperative games can be directly obtained by determining its lower and upper bounds, respectively. The method proposed in this
Introduction
Cooperative games with coalitions' payoffs represented by interval-values (IVs), which are called IV cooperative games for short, were first introduced by Branzei et al. (2003) . Presently, there has been increasing research on IV cooperative games. Branzei (Shapley, 1953 ) through using Moore's interval algebraic algorithms (Moore, 1979) . Han et al. (2012) proposed the IV core and the IV Shapley-like value of IV cooperative games by defining new order relation of intervals. Liao (2012) characterized the IV Shapley value with the weak inessential games property and the individual rationality property. Liao (2014) provided several axiomatizations of the IV Shapley value based on the equivalence theorem. AlparslanGök et al. (2010) studied some properties of the IV Shapley value on the class of size monotonic IV games and an axiomatic characterization of the IV Shapley value on the given special subclass of IV cooperative games. AlparslanGök (2014) and Palanci et al. (2015) further investigated on characterizing the IV Shapley values by using some properties. Palanci et al. (2016) introduced the IV Shapley value of a transportation IV game. However, most of the aforementioned methods used the partial subtraction operator or Moore's interval subtraction (Moore, 1979) which is not invertible and usually enlarges uncertainty of the resulted interval. Therefore, it is a very necessary and an important research on how to solve the IV cooperative games without using the interval subtraction and the ranking of intervals. Thereby, the main purpose of this paper is to developing a fast and simplified method for computing IV egalitarian Shapley values of IV cooperative games under some weaker conditions. In this method, through adding some weaker conditions such as the size monotonicity-like, we prove that the egalitarian Shapley value of any cooperative game is a monotonic and non-decreasing function of coalition's payoffs. Thus, the IV egalitarian Shapley value of any IV cooperative game can be directly and explicitly obtained via determining its lower and upper bounds by using the lower and upper bounds of the IV coalitions' payoffs, respectively. Moreover, we prove that the derived IV egalitarian Shapley values of IV cooperative games possess some useful and important properties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the concepts and notations of cooperative games, intervals, and IV cooperative games. Section 3 introduces the concept of IV egalitarian Shapley values of IV cooperative games and develops a fast and simplified method for computing IV egalitarian Shapley values under some conditions. Section 4 discusses several useful and important properties of the IV egalitarian Shapley values of IV cooperative games. In Section 5, the feasibility and applicability of the method proposed in this paper is illustrated with real examples. Conclusion is made in Section 6.
2.Interval and interval-valued cooperative games 2.1 Interval notation and arithmetic operations
An interval is denoted by [ 
where R   is any real number. . We usually write ( \ ) Si is defined as an IV cooperative game with the IV characteristic function   , where 
Interval-valued cooperative games
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3.Interval-valued egalitarian Shapley values
Inspired by the idea of the egalitarian Shapley value (Joosten, 1996) , for any IV cooperative game
is defined as follows: 
is any real number, which may be interpreted as an attitude factor.
Thus, we can easily obtain the egalitarian Shapley value
Here, ED ( and the Shapley value of the cooperative game ()
Accordingly, using Eq. (3), it easily follows from Eq. (4) that 
, then it easily follows from Eq. (5) that 
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Thus, the IV egalitarian Shapley values 
4.Some properties of interval-valued egalitarian Shapley values
It is obvious from Eq. (8) that the IV egalitarian Shapley value is a convex combination of the IV Shapley value and the IV equal division value (Li, 2016) . Accordingly, we can easily obtain some useful and important properties of IV egalitarian Shapley values of IV cooperative games through studying the properties of IV Shapley values and IV equal division values. 
In the same way to that of the Shapley value (Driessen, 1988; Owen, 1982) , we have
Analogously, according to Eq. (7), we can easily prove that 
It is derived from Eqs. (1) and (6) 
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Analogously, it can easily be proven from Eq. (7) that
. Accordingly, combining with the aforementioned conclusion, according to the definition of the interval equality as stated in Subsection 2.1, we obtain
i.e., 
It easily follows from the definition of player symmetry that
. Hence, it is easily derived from Eq. (6) that
In the same way, it is easily derived from Eq. 
Analogously, it is easily derived from Eq. (7)that Generally, IV egalitarian Shapley values of IV cooperative games do not satisfy the dummy player property, the null player property, and the invariance although IV Shapley values do. Moreover, IV egalitarian Shapley values do not always satisfy the individual rationality. . They plan to work together to sell houses for raising their gains. Due to the incomplete and uncertain information, they cannot precisely forecast their profits (or gains). Generally, they can estimate the ranges of their profits. In this case, the optimal allocation problem of profits for the salesmen may be regarded as a three-person IV cooperative game . Thus, we suppose that if they sell houses by themselves, then their profits are expressed with the intervals (1) , respectively. If all three salesmen (i.e., the grand coalition N ) work together, then the profit is expressed with the interval ( ) [2, 7] N  
. We want to compute the IV egalitarian Shapley value of the IV cooperative game (8)), the lower and upper bounds of the IV egalitarian Shapley value of the salesman 1 can be obtained as follows: (6) and (7) were used, then we have ESH 1 (1, 2) [ (1 (6) and (7)). The reason is that the IVcooperative game  is not size monotonic.
Conclusions
There are not effective and practical methods for IV cooperative games due to the invertible interval subtraction. We introduced the concept of IV egalitarian Shapley values for IV cooperative games and hereby develop a fast and simplified method for computing the IV egalitarian Shapley values for a subclass of IV cooperative games which satisfy some weaker condition of coalition monotonicity-like. This kind of IV cooperative games is rather large. Moreover, we have proven that the IV egalitarian Shapley values satisfy some useful and important properties such as the efficiency, additivity, the symmetry, and anonymity. In the future research, we will further study more effective and practical methods for computing the IV egalitarian Shapley values of IV cooperative games by relaxing the condition of coalition monotonicity-like.
